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Abstract 
This research provides measure of absolute and relative equity agency costs for 
corporations under different ownership and management structures. Miller 
(1977) argues that divergence of opinion among investors causes the price 
difference of the price of a security. The dispute mechanism causes the forming 
price to be further of closer to its intrinsic value. Greater the divergence of 
opmion, causes greater the gap between the price and its' intrinsic value. This 
study tests a new condition that reflects the existence of agency conflict, which 
is the conditions of stock price premium and stock price discount and related to 
agency cost control mechanism through foreign and domestic institutional 
ownership. The two conditions then called as price spread. This study tests four 
interrelated hypotheses in conditions of stock price premium and stock price 
discount that related to agency cost, foreign institutional ownership and 
domestic institutional ownership. Analysis method employs complete structural 
equation model (SEM), and multigroup S E M with constrained and 
unconstrained parameters. The direction of the study results consistent with 
result prediction. Nevertheless, there is one insignificant relationship, which is 
domestic institutional ownership towards agency cost. This indicates that the 
relationship hold but remains statistically unproven. 
Keywords: agency cost, institutional ownership, price spread 
Abstrak 
Penelitian ini menguji ukuran absolut dan relatif terhadap biaya keagenan pada 
berbagai kondisi kepemilikan. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa adanya 
perbedaan pendapat {divergence of opinion) akan menyebabkan perbedaan 
harga antara bid dan ask sehingga spread harga saham juga dapat digunakan 
untuk mengindikasikan adanya biaya keagenan dalam perusahaan. Terdapat dua 
kondisi yang diuji pada penelitian ini dan merupakan pertama kali diajukan, 
yaitu kondisi stock price discount dan stock price premium. Kedua kondisi ini 
diuji pada perbedaan kepemilikan yaitu kepemilikan asing dan domestik yang 
juga merupakan mekanisme pengendalian konflik keagenan. Metode analisis 
statistik yang digunakan adalah S E M dan multigroup SEM. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukkan konsisten dengan hipotesis bahwa kepemilikan asing mampu 
menjaga level biaya keagenan yang rendah sedangkan kepemilikan domestik 
terbukti memberikan hasil statistik tidak signifikan. 
Kata kunci: agency cost, institutional ownership, price spread 
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1. Research Background 
The social and private costs of an agent's actions due to incomplete 
alignment of the agent and owner's interests brought to attention by the seminal 
contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency costs. Agency theory 
has also brought the roles of managerial decision rights and various external and 
internal monitoring and bonding mechanisms to the forefront of theoretical 
discussions and empirical research. Great strides made in demonstrating 
empirically the role of agency costs in financial decisions such as in explaining 
the choices of capital structure, maturity structure, dividend policy and 
executive compensation. However, the actual measurement of the principal 
variable of interest, agency costs, in both absolute and relative terms, has lagged 
behind. j > t r , ^ ^ 
To measure absolute agency costs, a zero agency cost base case must be 
observed to serve as the reference point of comparison for all other cases of 
ownership and management structures. In the original Jensen and Meckling 
agency theory, the zero agency cost base case is, by definition, the firm owned 
solely by a single owner manager. When management owns less than 100 
percent of the firm's equity, shareholders incur agency costs resulting fi-om 
management's shirking and perquisite consumption. Because of limitations 
imposed by personal wealth constraints, exchange regulations on the minimum 
numbers of shareholders, and other considerations, no publicly traded firm 
entirely owned by management. Thus, Jensen and Meckling's zero agency cost 
base case unproven among the usual sample of publicly traded firms for which 
information is readily available. The absence of information about sole owner 
manager firms explain why agency costs often inferred but not directly 
measured in the empirical finance literature. 
At one extreme of ownership and management, structures are firms 
whose managers own 100 percent of the firm. These firms, by their definition, 
have no agency costs. At the other extreme are firms, by their definition, having 
no agency cost. At the other extreme are firms whose managers are paid 
employees with no equity in the firm. In the between are firms where the 
managers own some, but not all, of their firm's equity. 
Agency costs emerge when the interests of the firm's managers less 
aligned with those of the firm's owners, and take the form of preference for on 
the job perquisites, shirking and making self interested and entrenched decisions 
that reduce shareholder wealth. The magnitude of these costs is limited by how 
well the owners and delegated third parties, such as banks, monitor the actions 
of the outside managers. 
Miller (1977) proposes a theory explaining the creation of price between 
selling investor and buying investor. The theory in which Miller propose 
loosens the assumption of homogenous expectation in balance model. Miller 
(1977) argues that divergence of opinion among investors causes the price 
difference of the price of a security. The dispute mechanism causes the forming 
price to be further of closer to its intrinsic value. Greater the divergence of 
opinion, causes greater the gap between the price and its' intrinsic value. 
This study utilizes Miller's theory, which states disputes between buying 
and selling investor caused by divergence of opinion, which in this study 
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focused to the divergence of opinion the magnitude of agency cost. Divergence 
of opinion on the magnitude of agency cost in a period will certainly find a 
dominant party. This is shown by the formation of a closing price, which is 
agreed by buying investor and selling investor. 
How does the trade activity reflect a company's agency cost? 
Stockholders as owners of a company have strong interest with the price of the 
stocks they own. Beside stockholders, other parties are also interested in the 
stock price are potential stockholders or potential investors. The selling and 
buying process of stocks becomes the process of accomplishment of the 
agreement point, which produces closing price. How is the process of reaching 
closing price? Sellers (old stockholders) will sell with an as high ask or offer 
price as possible and the buyer (potential stockholder or potential investor) will 
try to buy with as low bid price as possible. In the ending session of ask-bid, 
closing price produced from the price bargaining process between the seller and 
the buyer. 
The next question is how do sellers set an offer price. How do buyers set 
a bid price? This study proposes an idea that the setting of offer price and bid 
price reflects conflict of interest between the parties in the company 
(management, stockholders and creditors). Conflict of interest between the 
parties in a company called agency conflict. Agency conflict, according to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), reflected in agency cost that the company bears 
and influence the wealth of all stakeholders. If the agency conflict is low, then 
closing price achieved in the transaction process will be closer to offer price. In 
the contrary, i f the agency cost is high, then closing price achieved in the 
transaction process wil l be closer to ask price. 
Studies about agency theory ignore the existence of agency conflict that 
reflected in the process of achieving closing price through negotiations between 
offer price and bid price. The studies more focused on the agency conflict 
control mechanism. This study tests a new condition, which reflects the 
existence of agency costs, which are stock price premium condition and stock 
price discount condition and related to agency conflict control mechanism 
through foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership. 
Both conditions then called price spread. Stock price premium is a condition 
that shows that closing price of company's closing price tends to be closer to 
offer price. Meanwhile, stock price discount is a condition that shows that 
closing price of company's stocks tends to be closer to bid price. Stock price 
premium and stock price discount show expectations of stockholders for 
ownership structure and agency cost which effects company's performance. 
This study proposes that price stock price premium condition and stock price 
discount are important issue in identifying the agency cost the company has to 
bear. Both conditions also reflect the level of agency conflict in the company. 
This study argues that in stock price premium condition, agency conflict is low 
and agency conflict is high in stock price discount condition. 
Closing price of the company's stock that is close to offer price shows 
that old stockholders (sellers) can obtain a price close to their offer price. 
Potential stockholders (buyers) are willing to buy with a price close to offer 
price is possibly because the stock is considered profitable in the future. Old 
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stockholder tend to hold their company's value on to the offer price. If old 
stockholders are convinced that the value of the company can be increased then 
they wil l retain the stock price in high offer price. This causes closing price that 
agreed between the parties to be close to offer price. In this case, potential 
stockholders are also convinced that the value of the company can be increased 
in the future. This study assumes that an expectation towards high company 
value caused by low agency cost. If old stockholders and potential stockholders 
percept that agency conflict is low, they value the company higher than the 
value of other similar companies. Closing price condition that is close to offer 
price in this study called as stock price premium condition. 
Stock price discount condition is a condition in the contrary of stock price 
premium condition. Closing price that is close to bid price shows that old 
stockholders (sellers) forced to sell their stocks with lower price then their offer. 
This is possibly because the offer price not responded by the market and old 
stockholder is in the position to sell their stocks immediately. Potential 
stockholders (buyers), in this condition, obtain the stocks with a price close to 
their bid price. In this condition, old stockholders realize that agency cost of the 
company is high, thus estimated that the future movement of stock price is 
unprofitable. Old stockholders forced to give a discount to potential 
stockholders. This condition causes the tendency of company's closing price 
agreed by both parties to be close to bid price. Potential stockholders (buyers) 
are convinced that high agency cost causes the company's value to be low but 
the value of the company can still be increased through the mechanism of 
ownership structure and financial policies of other companies. 
This study conducts observations of information of daily closing price 
(agreed) between sellers and buyers and the difference between offer price and 
closing price, and between bid price and closing price. Therefore, we can say 
that this study employs the perspective of market microstmcture to explain 
agency cost. Studies in the subject of microstructure give a deep understanding 
in examining the behavior and operation of the capital market based on intra-
day movement. This study employs a microstructure approach that combined 
with corporate finance research model. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) states that bid ask spread measurement 
can be used to determine price of an asset (stocks, bonds, and others). Their 
studies in the microstructure are also useful to determine the value of an asset in 
corporate finance. This study relates the findings of bid-ask spread as an 
indicator in determining stock price with agency cost and introduce price spread 
condition, which consists of stock price premium and stock price discount. 
So far, studies on the agency theory do not test the existence of 
bargaining between old stockholders (sellers) with potential stockholders 
(buyers) in achieving closing price. Different closing prices reflect different 
agency conflicts among companies. The effect of different agency conflicts 
among companies will cause a number of companies to be in stock price 
premium condition and others in stock price discount condition. The condition 
of stock price premium and stock price discount difference causes the effect of 
foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership as agency 
conflict control mechanisms towards agency cost to be different. Identification 
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of stock price premium and stock price discount conditions in this study is 
expected to give better explanation the different effects various agency cost 
reduction mechanism. This study focuses on foreign institutional ownership and 
domestic institutional ownership as agency conflict reduction mechanism. 
The existence of different results fi"om past studies about the relationship 
between foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership to 
agency cost urge researcher to test their relationship between the three 
constructs. This study also introduces price spread condition, which is expected 
to explain the difference among the effects of agency conflict control 
mechanism through foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional 
ownership better. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Agency Cost 
The core of agency theory is the existence of conflict of interest between 
agents and principal. The agency cost, which occurs because of this conflict of 
interest, reduces the value of the company. Equity agency cost includes 
monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Monitoring cost include principals' expense, in the effort to control agent's 
behavior through budget tightening, compensation policy, and operational 
regulations. Bonding costs are the agent's expense to guarantee that agents will 
not conduct certain actions that will inflict financial loss towards principals or 
to guarantee that principals will give compensations i f agents conduct certain 
actions. 
Residual loss includes the monetary value of principals' wealth reduction 
because of different interests between agents and principals, which stimulate 
agents, conduct selfish actions and inflict financial loss to principals. The action 
of this agent can be in the form of inefficient actions such as investing in 
unprofitable investments or make wasteful expenses. Moreover, there is also 
debt agency cost that includes paying too much dividend, monitoring cost and 
bonding cost. Reduction of agency cost can be achieved through a number of 
mechanisms such as through manager stock ownership, combining financing 
sources from debts and equities, and dividend payout (Crutchley and Hansen, 
1989). 
This study wil l relate agency cost and price spread condition between 
stock price premium and stock price discount experienced by the company. 
Agency conflict experienced by the company will be reflected in the spread of 
stock price premium ad stock price discount of the company. Agency conflict 
reflected in the stock price premium and stock price discount condition are an 
agency conflict that is called perceived conflict. Therefore, this study employs 
perceived agency conflict (stock price premium and stock price discount) to 
explain actual agency conflicts. 
2.2. Price Spread: Stock Price Premium and Stock Price Discount 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) employ the term stock price premium 
to explain reasons of companies that pays dividend and companies that do not 
pay dividend. This study adopts the term stock price premium and stock price 
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discount but to test the influence of ownership structure and agency cost 
towards company performance. Stock price premium and stock price discount 
will be called price spread condition. 
Price spread condition of stock price premium and price spread 
conditions of stock price discount are implications from company's agency 
conflict. Closing price that is close to offer price and bid price shows that 
buyers and sellers do take into account agency cost in daily transactions. The 
level of agency conflict will cause difference between closing price and the 
offer and bid price. The stock price premium condition shows that the closing 
price of a company is close to offer price. The stock price premium condition 
reflects the low level of agency conflict. On the other hand, the stock price 
discount condition shows that the closing price of a company is close to bid 
price. The stock price discount condition reflects the low level of agency 
conflict. 
2.3. Foreign and Domestic Institutional Ownership 
Ownership structure becomes important in agency theory because most 
agency conflict arguments are caused by ownership and control separation. 
Agency conflict does not occur in companies with 100% management 
ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The condition where new owners buy 
company's stocks causes discrepancy of interest between the parties in the 
company. Pure conflict occur between principals and agents as discussed in 
positivist agency theory and conflicts between stockholders, management, 
employees and other parties are within principal-agent research (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Institutional ownership can be used to reduce agency conflict (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Jarrel and Poulsen, 1987; Brickley et al., 1988; Graves and 
Waddock, 1990; Han et a l , 1999; and Varma, 2001). The studies argue that 
institutions that invest in the company will monitor a company better. 
Institutions have professionals in the field of investing which understands the 
appraisal mechanisms of companies and conduct monitoring towards managers. 
Institutional ownership selling will drive down the price of the stocks 
therefore institutional owners avoid selling their stocks and them conduct 
monitoring towards the company instead. Institutional ownership expects by 
condicting effective monitoring the value of the company would increase. The 
most efficient method employed by institutional owners is by informal 
discussions with managers. 
Hypothesis development based on the argument that this study is 
developed in the conceptual element. Hypothesis development consists of a 
number of components, which are foreign institutional ownership, domestic 
institutional ownership, agency cost and company performance in stock price 
premium and stock price discount condition. 
Agency theory argues that institutional ownership wil l decrease agency 
conflict because the institution will help monitor the company so management 
will not conduct actions that will inflict financial losses towards stockholders 
(Crutchley et al., 1999; Chen and Steiner, 1999). This is valid in the condition 
where institutional owner partially monitor the management. However, in the 
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condition where institutional owner is the majority owner, then monitoring 
would be focused only for the interest of owning institution and ignores public 
stockholders interest. Foreign institutional ownership can be utilized as control 
method to decrease agency cost. The higher the foreign institutional ownership, 
the lower the agency cost and the lower the foreign institutional ownership, the 
higher the agency cost. 
H i : Foreign institutional ownership has negative influence towards 
agency cost. 
This study assumes that agency conflict in stock price premium condition 
will be lower compared to stock price discount condition. This assumption 
cause's agency conflict reduction mechanism through foreign institutional 
ownership in stock price premium condition will have influence less negative 
compare to stock price discount condition. Companies with low agency conflict 
wil l closely observe the cost to control agency conflict. So they tend to decrease 
conflict reduction mechanism through ownership structure to drive cost down. 
H2: Foreign institutional ownership will affect agency cost negatively; 
lower when firm is in stock price premium than stock price discount 
condition. ^ 
Domestic institutional ownership also acts as a monitoring party, similar 
to foreign institutional ownership. Core and Larcker (2002) found a negative 
relationship between stock performance and domestic institutional ownership. 
Companies with high institutional ownership (more than 5%) indicate its ability 
to monitor the management. Great institutional ownership causes the utilization 
of company's assets to be more efficient. Therefore, the proportion of 
institutional ownership acts as a method to prohibit management from 
inefficient. 
Ismiyanti and Hanafi (2004) found that the average institutional 
ownership in 1997-2001period reaches 66% of total stocks outstanding. This 
result shows that public (individual) investors, management, directors and 
institutional ownership hold 34% of stocks. This is different in the United 
States, institutional ownership reaches 52.36%) from total stocks outstanding in 
1999 (Chen and Steiner, 1999). Domestic institutional ownership can be utilized 
as confrol method to decrease agency cost. 
H 3 : Domestic institutional ownership has negative influence toward 
agency cost 
This study assumes that agency conflict in stock price premium condition 
will be lower compared to stock price discount condition. This assumption 
cause's agency conflict reduction mechanism through foreign institutional 
ownership in stock price premium condition will have influence less negative 
compared to stock price discount condition. Companies with low agency 
conflict wi l l closely observe the cost to control agency conflict. So they tend to 
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decrease conflict reduction mechanism through ownership structure to drive 
cost down. 
H 4 : Domestic institutional ownership will affect agency cost negatively; 
lower when firm is in stock price premium than stock price discount 
condition 
The relationship between foreign institutional ownership, domestic 
institutional ownership and agency cost through stock price premium and stock 
price discount condition, describes in research framework as below: 





Price Spread A g e n c y Cos t 
H . J i H4 
r 
Domestic Institutional Ownership 
Note: Price spread consists o f stock price premium and stock price discount 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
3. Research Methods 
3.1. Data and Sample 
Samples employed in this study are non-fmancial companies listed in 
Jakarta Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2004. Financial data obtained from annual 
financial report, which consists of balance sheet, income (profit and loss) 
statement, cash flow report and financial report notes. The data source for the 
study is Jakarta Stock Exchange Library, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 
(ICMD) and Indonesian Securities Market Database (ISMD) published by 
Faculty of Economics Gadjah Mada University. 
3.2. Operational Definition Variables 
Agency cost proxy employed in this study refer to asset utilization and 
operational cost (Ang et al., 2000); and free cash flow (Hackel et al., 1996) but 
with adaptation based on certain benchmark value. Agency cost calculation 
method ideally uses the difference of residual loss from 100% company 
ownership minus residual loss from non 100% ownership. Sample collection 
constraint towards 100% company ownership causes the utilization of a 
benchmark value. The asset utilization measure agency cost based on asset 
turnover. Asset turnover is a ratio between total sales and total asset. Selling and 
General Administrative (SGA) is included in operational expense proxy. 
Operational expense measures the agency expenses based on S G A which 
a ratio between operational expense and total sales. Free cash flow used in this 
study employs free cash flow counting method developed by Hackel et al. 




was selected because it is the most appropriate method for the condition of cash 
flow statement in Indonesia to avoid sample decrease. 
FCF = TFCF + DOCO + D C E X 
TFCF (OCR - OCX)) - C F X 
where: 
TFCF = traditional free cash flow 
O C R = operating cash inflow 
O C O = operating cash outflow 
C E X = capital expenditure 
DOCO = (OCOgrowth - salesgrowth) * 2.0 (* OCO) 
where: 
DOCO = discretionary operating cash outlay; Hackel et al. (1996) assumes 20% 
of OCO is discretionary of OCO and sales growth. 
D C E X = (CEXgrowth - CostofGoodsSoldGrowth*) C E X 
where: 
D C E X = discretionary capital expenditure O C O growth = (OCOt - O C O M ) / 
OCOt_i Sales 
Growth = (Salest -Salesn) / Salest.i C E X growth= (CEXt - CEXt_i)/CEXt.i 
Cost of Goods 
Sold ( C O G S ) Growth = (COGSt - COGSt-i)/COGSt.i 
Stock price premium show that closing price tends to be close to offer 
price. Stock price discount show that closing price tends to be close at bid price. 
Stock Price Premium = [Closing Price - Offer Price] 
Stock Price Discount = [Closing Price - Bid Price| . 
Foreign institutional ownership is the sum and percentage of stocks 
owned by foreign institution. Domestic institutional ownership is percentage 
ownership by a legal entity registered as non-public stockholder. 
3.3. Method of Analysis 
This research employs Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in 
hypotheses testing because S E M has the ability to combine measurement model 
and structural model. This research applied two stage approaches for multigroup 
structural equation modeling (MSEM). M S E M do not require nested model to 
estimate different hypotheses groups in path-analytic model coefficient or 
model fit coefficient. A series of statistical goodness-of-fit indicators were 
employed to test a complex model for every group. 
Moderating variable test is S E M was conducted in two structural models, 
which are constrained parameters model and unconstrained parameters model. 
In models with constrained parameters, regression estimate weight controlled 
for both sample groups thus having similar estimated relationship. Moderating 
variable is significant i f models with unconstrained parameters are better than 
models with constrained parameters. 
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4. Result and Discussion 
Result of full structural equation model in this research will be used to 
analyze research hypotheses that do not contain stock price premium and stock 
price discount moderating variables, which are H i and H 3 . Hypotheses which 
used stock price premium and stock price discount moderating variables (H2 
and H 4 ) , are tested by employing multigroup structural equation model by using 
constrained parameters and unconstrained parameters models. 
Table 1. Result of Full Structural Equation Model 
Structural Relationship Unstandardized Standard Critical Regression Weight Error Ratio 
Agency Cost ^ Foreign hist. Ownr. -0.243 0.086 -3.481* 
Agency Cost <- Domestic Inst. Ownr. -0.378 . 0.092 -0.643 
Asset Utilization <- Agency Cost 1.000 
Operating Expense <- Agency Cost 0.863 0.078 5.429* 
Free Cash Flow <- Agency Cost 0.068 0.089 0.983 
Note: * significant at 10% 
Table 2 shows test result by multigroup structural equation model with 
constrained parameters. Regression coefficient value of ownership structure 
influence (foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership) 
towards agency costs is not different when compared between stock price 
premium sample and stock price discount sample. The numbers of data used for 
the study are 1559 samples comprising of 713 samples with stock price 
premium and 846 samples in stock price discount. 
Table 2. Result of Price Spread Multigroup Structural Equation Model 
with Constrained Parameters 
Structural 
Relationship 




Ratio Regression Weight 
Critical 
Ratio 
A C ^ P F I O W N -0.483 -7.195* -0.483 -7.195* 
A C ^ P D I O W N -0.036 -0.457 -0.036 -0.457 
A U ^ A C 1.000 1.000 
O E ^ A C 0.079 3.159* 0.079 3.159* 
F C F <r AC 0.275 2.064 0.275 2.064 
Goodness of Fit 
Chi Square 259.652 G F I 0.942 
Degree o f Freedom 57 A G F I 0.931 ^ 
Probability 0.000 R M R 0.006 
Chi Square/DF 4.555 R M S E A 0.062 
Note: * significant at 10% 
Table 3 shows test result by multigroup structural equation model with 
unconstrained parameters. Regression coefficient value of ownership structure 
influence (Foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership) 
towards agency cost is not different when compared between stock price 
premium sample and stock price discount sample. The numbers of data used for 
the study are 1559 samples comprising of 713 samples with stock price 
premium and 846 samples in stock price discount. 
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Goodness of fit of model with unconstrained parameters (GFI= 0.976) is 
found to be better than model goodness of fit of model with constrained 
parameters (GFI= 0.942). In addition, the difference at chi square value is 
56.585 with 4 degree of freedom show a significant result (p < 0.10). Therefore, 
base model and alternative model based on the difference of stock price 
premium and stock price discount are significantly different. This indicates that 
different price spread condition significantly influential as moderating variables. 
Variable moderation of price spread condition mainly seen on the difference 
between foreign institutional ownership, domestic institutional ownership and 
agency cost on stock price premium and stock price discount. Comparison 
between base model and alternative model shown in Table 4. 
Table 3. Result of Price Spread Multigroup Structural Equation Model 
with Unconstrained Parameters 
Structural 
Relationship 
Stock Price Premium Sample Stock Price Discount Sample 
Unstandardized Critical Unstandardized Critical 
Regression Weight Ratio Regression Weight Ratio 
A C ^ P F I O W N -0.542 -3.267* -0.946 -6.465* 
A C ^ P D I O W N -0.087 -0.785 -0.236 -1.463 
A U <- A C 1.000 1.000 
O E ^ A C 0.085 5.078* 0.098 4.842* 
F C F <r AC 0.497 3.287* 0.096 0.823 
Goodness of Fit 
C h i Square 203.067 G F I 0.976 
Degree o f Freedom 53 A G F I 0.943 
Probabi l i ty 0.000 R M R 0.028 
C h i Square /DF 3,831 R M S E A 0.067 
Note : * significant at 10% 
Table 4 shows comparison of test result between base model (constrained 
model) and alternative model (unconstrained model). The values being 
compared are goodness of fit value, chi square value and degree of freedom of 
both test models to determine whether stock price premium and stock price 
discount is significantly moderate relationships in this model. Table 4 shows the 
result of test comparison using constrained parameters and unconstrained 
parameters. The table shows increase of goodness of fit values, from base model 
to alternative model. Goodness of fit value analyzed is chi square value, which 
changed 56.585 points, and degree of freedom, which changed 4 points. Based 
on goodness of fit of base model and alternative model, it can be concluded that 
relationship between variable of agency cost and performance, moderated by 
stock price premium and stock price discount. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Goodness of Fit from Base Model and Alternative 
Model of Price Spread 





(unconstrained parameter) Criteria 
Chi Square 259.642 203.067 L o w 
Degree o f Freedom 57 53 
Probability 0.000 0.000 > 0.05 
Chi Square/DF 4.555 3.831 < 5 
G F I 0.942 0.976 > 0.90 
A G F I 0.931 0.943 > 0 . 9 0 
R M R 0.006 0.028 <0 .03 
R M S E A 0.062 0.067 <0 .08 
Goodness of Fit Increase from Base Model to Alternative 
C h i Square 259.652 -203 .067 = 56.585 H i g h 
Degree o f Freedom 5 7 - 5 3 = 4 ; • 
Probability Less than 0.005 < 0.05 
Conclusion Alternative model (unconstrained model) is significantly different from base model 
(constrained model) Thus, price spread (stock price p r emium and stock price 
discount) significantly moderates direct and indirect relationship between ownership 
structure (foreign institutional ownership, and domestic institutional ownership) and 
agency cost. 
Table 5 is a summary table between result predictions with research 
resuhs, which utilizes fiill structural equation model with constrained 
parameters, and unconstrained parameters model in stock price premium and 
stock price discount as moderating variable. Table 6 shows comparison resuh 
prediction with model test resuh using full structural equation model. The 
direction of the study results found to be consistent with result prediction, which 
is negative. Nevertheless, there is one insignificant relationship, which is 
domestic institutional ownership towards agency cost. This indicates that the 
relationship is practically proofened but remain statistically unproven. 
Table 5. Comparison of Test Result Prediction with Unmoderated 
Full Structural Equation Model 
Relationship Result Full SEM Prediction Result 
Agency Cost Foreign histitutional Ownership Negative - 0.243* 
Agency Cost ^ Domestic Institutional Ownership Negative - 0.378 
Table 6 is a summary table between result predictions with research 
results, which utilizes multigroup structural equation model in stock price 
premium, and stock price discount as moderating variable. The result of the 
study shows that coefficient value of stock price discount should be lower than 
coefficient value of stock price premium. The influence of agency cost towards 
performance found to be different. Coefficient of stock price premium is lower 
than stock price discount. 
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Table 6. Comparison of Test Result Prediction with Multigroup Structural 




Test Result Prediction with 






A g e n c y Cost ^ Foreign hist Ownership SPD<SPP<0 -0.542* -0.946* 
A g e n c y Cost <- Domest ic hist. Ownership SPD<SPP<0 -0.087 -0.236 
Note: * significant at 10% 
5. Result and Discussion 
Table 7 show a summary of hypotheses test result of the study. Next 
studies expected to reexamine agency conflict magnitude proxy through stock 
price premium and stock price discount. This is to support the findings of this 
study and that the proxy can be used as measurement method of agency conflict 
in Indonesia. Further studies can also develop other mechanisms in agency 
conflict control such as debt policy and dividend policy. 
Table 7. Summary of Hypothesis Test Result of the Study 
Hypotheses Test 
Result 
Structural equation model on all study samples 
H i : Foreign institutional ownership have negative influence towards agency cost Jf,4> 
H 3 : Domest ic institutional ownership have negative influence towards agency cost a 
Structural equation model on stock price premium and stock price discount samples 
H2: Foreign institutional ownership w i l l affect agency cost negatively; lower when 4^41 
firm is in stock price p remium than stock price discount condition. 
H 4 : Domest ic institutional ownership w i l l affect agency cost negatively; lower 4i 
when firm is i n stock price premium than stock price discount condition. 
Explanat ion: 
• * : E m p i r i c a l result consistent to theoretical prediction and significant 
• : E m p i r i c a l result consistent to theoretical prediction and not significant 
This will enrich findings that support measurements of stock price 
premium and stock price discount conflict. For investors, this study suggests 
investors to select companies, which have low agency conflicts. This will then 
influence the company's stock prices. Companies wil l then be encouraged to 
reduce conflict and increase their financial performance. If this situation can be, 
achieved Indonesia will be a profitable investment area. 
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